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LEGISLATURES AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE
REFORM OF DIVORCE LAW
Carl E. Schneider*
A SILENT REVOLUTION: ROUTINE POLICY MAKING AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. By

Herbert Jacob. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988. Pp. 184.
$19.95.

It is now widely understood that in the last two decades American
family law has been transformed. What is not widely understood is
how that transformation occurred. It is a transformation of remarkable scope, a scope yet more striking for having been made not in one
national decision, but in fifty state legislatures. And the obvious explanations do not fully account for the transformation. True, social attitudes and social behavior have shifted dramatically; but to say that is
not to explain why the law changed. No bureaucracy made divorce
reform its business. No interest group on the model of the civil rights
or ecology movements demanded changes. Indeed, far from being politically controverted, much of the transformation went almost unnoticed. In A Silent Revolution, a political scientist, Professor Herbert
Jacob, contributes notably to our understanding of this puzzling transformation. The purpose of this review is to make the fact, the substance, and the quality of that contribution better known among
lawyers and legal academics.
Professor Jacob's book examines perhaps the central aspect of the
transformation of American family law - the reworking in the last
two decades of the law surrounding divorce. Until the mid-1960s,
America thought of itself as having "fault-based" divorce. Divorce
was an adversary proceeding in which one spouse alleged that the
other had violated a basic obligation of marriage in some serious way,
usually by committing adultery, by deserting his or her family, or by
treating his or her spouse cruelly. By the mid-1970s, however,
America could think of itself as having "no-fault" divorce. To obtain
a divorce a spouse had only to allege, in some form, that the marriage
had broken down. This triumph of no-fault divorce alone was impressive, and it was made more so by accompanying revisions of the principles of the law governing alimony, the division of marital property,
and child custody.
• Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1972, Harvard University; J.D. 1979,
University of Michigan. - Ed.
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Reforms of such magnitude are likely to rest on large-scale social
changes, and, as Professor Jacob notes, twentieth-century America has
been prolific of changes in family life. Longer life-spans and smaller
families have meant that couples generally live together longer, and
particularly live together longer after their children have left them.
Women have increasingly entered the workforce, not just before they
have children and after their children have left home, but while their
children are young. Further, women have increasingly found betterpaying jobs. These economic changes, Professor Jacob suggests, have
both worsened tensions within marriages and made it easier - economically, socially, and psychologically - for women to leave them.
The revival of feminism in the early 1960s heightened these effects.
And social and personal expectations of marriage - that it be intensely rewarding, that it be a partnership of equals - grew at the
same time that divorce came to seem less wrong and even less harmful
personally and socially. These movements in social attitudes and
structure were reflected in changing views about divorce laws: in
1966, only thirteen percent of the population believed divorce laws
were too strict; in 1974, after no-fault divorce had become widely
available, one-third of the population thought so.
Changing social facts, and even changing opinions about law, do
not by themselves change law. What transformed new attitudes toward divorce into new law? Professor Jacob begins that story in New
Yark. New York notoriously had the most restrictive divorce law in
the country; adultery was the only ground for divorce. And New
Yark notoriously had the most flouted divorce law in the country; the
same kind of fraudulent adultery that was long the stuff of English
novels and life was regularly confected in New York. The delicateminded (and well-to-do) New Yorker went to Reno, for Nevada had a
short residency requirement and a liberal divorce statute. The gap between the law on the books and the law in action distressed many who
knew about it and particularly distressed the lawyers and judges who
collaborated in or countenanced the hypocrisy and perjury which
made the system work.
The catalyst of divorce reform in New York was a public relations
man and law student who was a Democratic member of the New York
legislature. Quite by chance, he came upon the issue and, in the hope
of attracting attention and promoting his career, embraced it. He
found that divorce reform won him little attention. But he did find an
ally in an admiralty lawyer who was chairman of a special committee
on family law of the elite Bar Association of the City of New York,
which was concerned about the fraud that suffused New York divorce
law. The legislator and the lawyer went to Professor Henry Foster, of
the New York University Law School, an expert in family law. Professor Foster drafted both a bill and a legislative committee's report on
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the bill, a report which emphasized the problem of fraud and of public
confidence in the law.
In the legislature, the bill attracted bipartisan support and little
opposition, even from the Catholic Church. The Church's power had
long been feared by proponents of divorce reform in New York, but its
political strength had recently been eroded and its efforts were directed to battles over abortion and parochial school aid. Legislators
who disliked the bill because it made divorce easier were accorded an
amendment providing for compulsory conciliation proceedings. The
press ignored the issue. Thus, even though the Bar Association of the
City of New York was the only interest group actively backing the bill,
it became law in 1966. The statute was justified as improving the honesty of divorce proceedings, not as introducing no-fault divorce. But
when, a few years later, the waiting period for divorce after separation
was reduced to one year, it was widely said that no-fault divorce had
come to New York.
While New York had had perhaps the most conservative divorce
law in the country, California had, at least in practice, one of the most
liberal. Nevertheless, California's was a fault-based statute. In the
early 1960s, a group of elite matrimonial lawyers from the San Francisco Bay area who felt that the law invited dishonesty and exacerbated the hostility between divorcing spouses began to work toward
reform. They were joined by a similar group from Los Angeles. They
testified before a legislative committee to advocate reforms, including
no-fault divorce. In 1966, Governor Edmund Brown appointed a
Commission on the Family which included members of both the San
Francisco and Los Angeles groups. Arguing that no-fault divorce was
already effectively available, the Commission (in the most conservative
of terms and tones) advocated eliminating fault grounds altogether
and altering a number of other aspects of California's divorce law. In
1967, these proposals were in their essentials introduced into the legislature by a conservative Republican. As in New York, the bill was
presented as primarily a technical and limited reform of the law, and it
attracted little notice and little opposition. The bill passed and was
signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan.
The next stage of the transformation of divorce law involved the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
NCCUSL was founded in 1892 as a quasi-public group of law professors, elite lawyers, and legislators funded by appropriations from the
states and by grants from private sources. It was intended to promote
uniform state laws by proposing (in conjunction with the American
Bar Association) drafts of laws in areas in which uniformity among
the states might be desirable. The NCCUSL had been interested in
divorce law since its inception, and by the mid-1960s a group of elite
divorce lawyers and law professors had convinced the Conference that
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the widespread dishonesty in divorce proceedings, the unduly adversarial nature of divorce proceedings, and the great diversity of divorce
standards among the states justified another try at formulating a uniform statute. Once again, in other words, the problem was formulated
by lawyers in relatively technical lawyer's terms.
Elite law-reform organizations like the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute usually work through a committee staffed by a "reporter" who is commonly a law professor expert in the relevant field.
In this case, the co-reporters were Professor Robert Levy, who was
and is a family law specialist at the University of Minnesota Law
School, and Professor Herma Hill Kay, who taught and teaches family
law at Boalt Hall and who had been prominent in the reform of California divorce law. The reporters drafted, and the committee and the
Conference adopted, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The
UMDA not only offered states a model no-fault divorce statute, it proposed an entire body of family law, one including reforms of the law of
marital property, alimony, and child custody. Yet despite the
UMDA's sweep, debate over it was primarily technical and ignored
the many difficult social issues the UMDA implicated. Approval by
the ABA's House of Delegates, while inhibited by institutional and
personal conflicts, came in 1973, reasonably easily and without discussion of any underlying social issues.
It is hard to say how much influence the UMDA had and how
much its advocacy of no-fault divorce simply reflected the temper of
the times. The endorsement of no-fault divorce by such respectable
and conservative institutions as the NCCUSL and the ABA at least
promoted a trend toward reform that had already gathered considerable momentum: By 1974, forty-five states had what could be described
as no-fault divorce. By 1985, every state had no-fault divorce grounds,
although many states also retained fault grounds. This description of
reform's extent is somewhat misleading, however, since "no-fault" is
an ambiguous term. Pure no-fault statutes permit divorce if the marriage has irretrievably broken down, but statutes allowing divorce after separation for a defined period are also often considered no-fault
statutes. By the latter standard, a number of states had had no-fault
divorce well before the 1960s. Even in those states, however, the
1960s and 1970s brought an increased receptivity to rapid divorce on
demand.
The UMDA also contributed to the reform of the other significant
components of divorce law: the law of marital property, alimony, and
child support. Except in a few community property states, property
had traditionally been allocated to the spouse who owned it at the time
of the divorce, an allocation heavily influenced by the name in which
the property was held. In the 1970s, this rule was increasingly abandoned in favor of systems that were more inclined to treat property as

May 1988]

Legislatures and Legal Change

1125

marital rather than as the property of individuals, that explicitly recognized in economic terms nonfinancial contributions to a family's
well-being, that ignored marital fault in allocating property, and that
gave judges discretion to divide property "equitably." Alimony had,
in principle, traditionally been available to wives innocent of marital
fault until they remarried. This rule was increasingly abandoned in
favor of rehabilitative alimony - alimony designed only to help a
spouse (whether maritally at fault or not) regain the ability to support
himself or herself. Finally, custody of children had traditionally gone
to the mother. In the 1970s and 1980s, this maternal presumption
weakened and various forms of joint custody grew more appealing. _
How, then, does Professor Jacob explain the transformation of divorce law? First, it is worth noting several forces that played a smaller
part than might be expected. The Roman Catholic Church, whose
opposition to divorce was well-established and well-known, had little
effect on the legislative debates of most states. Feminism had a somewhat greater impact, but the feminist position on these issues was undeveloped, and there were feminists on both sides. Further, the
women's movement was absorbed in other issues, like the Equal
Rights Amendment. Indeed, no interest group, to say nothing of any
mass movement, was deeply committed to reforming divorce law. Bar
associations were involved in every state's reform effort, but not intensively: divorce law is a relatively low-status practice, and not all divorce lawyers favored no-fault divorce. Even the press widely ignored
the reform. And because of the low visibility of divorce reform, it was
not an issue which legislators could use to advance their careers.
So let us repeat the question. How does Professor Jacob believe
the transformation was worked? Changes in social structure and social attitudes made the transformation certainly less controversial and
perhaps plainly desirable. Reform cost the fisc nothing and gained in
respectability and even in appeal as more and more states adopted it.
Reform cost almost nothing politically too, since the absence of publicity about it helped ensure the absence of opposition to it. All these
factors allowed a minute number of reformers, often lawyers with professional interests in divorce law, to work with a small number oflegislators to achieve their goals. They succeeded because they did nothing
to alter the conditions I have just described: they carefully defined
their proposals as conservative, incremental, and technical changes in
the law; they denied they were dealing with any significant social
problems; they strove not to stir up interest-group opposition and
worked assiduously to propitiate the likeliest powerful opponent, the
Catholic Church; and they asserted their special expertise against the
claims of laymen.
In sum, Professor Jacob argues, the transformation of American
divorce law exemplifies "routine policymaking." Professor Jacob
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notes that we ordinarily think of policy as created in a fierce conflict
between deeply motivated interest groups. But legislatures could not
accomplish all they need to if all policy were made that way. In fact,
much policy is made quite routinely-reforms are drawn narrowly
and described as conservative, experts are prominently relied on, the
costs of reforms are kept low, and public attention is avoided.
But even if divorce reform was achieved through routine policymaking, its effects were not trivial: no-fault divorce was universalized, the common law principles for dividing property on divorce were
widely abandoned, alimony became rarer and shorter, and joint custody of the children of divorced parents made maternal custody less
automatic. A Silent Revolution thus closes by evaluating these reforms. Professor Jacob observes that assessments of divorce reform
depend on who you ask and what they thought the reforms were
meant to do. The kind of lawyers who advocated no-fault divorce
have not systematically evaluated divorce reform, but their general impression is that no-fault has reduced fraud and acrimony in divorce
proceedings. The most extensive and best publicized consideration of
the new laws by a social scientist has been Lenore Weitzman's The
Divorce Revolution (1985). Professor Weitzman argued that reform
has generally disserved women by reducing the sense that marriage is
for life, by depriving wives of the bargaining chip that fault-based divorce often provided, and by eliminating the advantages that the innocent wife had under no-fault divorce. Professor Weitzman also
reported that rehabilitative alimony terminates sooner than traditional
alimony and that it often fails of its rehabilitative purpose. Finally,
she noted that the weakening of the presumption that mothers get custody gave fathers a bargaining chip they had not had before. Professor
Weitzman's figures suggested that, one year after a divorce, men's
standard of living had risen forty-two percent, while women's had
fallen seventy-three percent. Professor Jacob is skeptical of Professor
Weitzman's conclusions. He observes that her data are from California, whose laws are less favorable to women than those of many other
states, and that other studies reach different results. He sketches national data he has examined which indicate that any difference that
no-fault divorce has made is slight and is in women's favor.
I hope that this all-too-abbreviated survey of Professor Jacob's
book has convinced you that it warrants reading. The book is not, of
course, without faults. But its faults are largely amiable ones, often
the product of its admirable ambition. Professor Jacob has, after all,
not only undertaken to investigate three major reforms - those of nofault divorce, of marital property and alimony, and of child custody each with a different legislative career, but also to develop an analysis
of "routine policymaking." The book's scope deters some of its parts
from being as fully developed as the reader might wish. For instance,
Professor Jacob describes the legislative adoption of no-fault divorce
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with uncommon efficiency (such stories are usually related in such stupefying detail that their structure is wholly obscured). But he does not
attempt an equally enlightening account of how marital-property and
child-custody law were rewritten.
Professor Jacob's exploration of whether the changes he describes
can aptly be called a "revolution" is also somewhat limited. This
question is important because it speaks to his suggestion that revolutionary change can be achieved through routine policymaking. As he
notes, many features of the reform were part of the law of some jurisdictions well before the 1960s. Some of the "revolution" in divorce
grounds, for example, was accomplished by simply relabelling as "nofault" statutes which permitted divorce where couples had been living
apart. This prefiguring of reforms is, after all, what made it possible to
describe them as merely incremental. Furthermore, a great deal of old
doctrine still persists - some states did not abolish fault grounds
when they adopted no-fault grounds, and many states have not drastically revised their law of marital property and child custody. Even
where doctrine has clearly changed, judicial behavior may not have.
Judicial resistance is always a _possible impediment to reform, particularly where, as in family law, judges are accorded wide discretion.
Most of the reform statutes are notably undirective. For example, the
UMDA's marital property and child custody provisions offer judges
only a long list of criteria, without explaining a criterion's intended
effect or weight. With statutes so vague, and with the circumstances
of families varying so much, appellate courts cannot readily supervise
trial courts or develop systematic standards which might guide them.
Further, most families do not have enough property for courts to divide and do not dispute who is to have custody of the children. And
most of the post-divorce relations between parties are negotiated, not
set by courts, although legal rules presumably affect negotiations. In
sum, we are left wondering how effective the revolution Professor Jacob describes can be and thus what the scope of routine policymaking
is.
My own sense is that the changes in family law have been greater
than these considerations would suggest. The revolution is, I think,
sparked and sustained by a set of ideological assumptions which are
widely shared among many elite segments of society, assumptions having to do with egalitarianism and with psychologically derived views
of human nature. Professor Jacob tends to neglect such factors.
While he is sensitive to the broad social changes that underlay the
legislative reforms, he only hints at the process by which particular
groups of people perceived those social changes, conceptualized them,
brought them into social discourse, and proposed legislative responses
to them. For instance, we are told that experts in family law were
central in the reform process, but we are not told about the law review
literature that preceded the reforms. I suspect that had Professor Ja-
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cob pursued these questions further, both his explanation of the reforms and his description of their scope would have been more fully
textured and convincing.
The reader is also left tantalized by the chapter which evaluates the
various reforms. Professor Jacob, of course, is hampered by the fact
that the reforms are so recent. This has meant, for example, that studies of joint custody are largely meaningless, since parents pioneering
joint custody have tended to be self-selected enthusiasts, since the social scientists studying them have tended to be partisan, and since it is
too early to measure the long-term effects on children. Similarly, studies of the financial consequences of divorce reform have generally been
of single jurisdictions, and it is too early to tell yet, for example, which
effects are the effects of no-fault divorce and which are the effects of
changes in marital property law. Professor Jacob does give us a
glimpse of his own intriguing study, which uses national data, but it is
only a glimpse.
Finally, the reader is left hungry for a more extensive discussion of
Professor Jacob's intriguing ideas about routine policymaking. Perhaps because the case-study format is limiting, many questions are not
fully addressed: What are other examples of routine policymaking?
When is it likely to occur? What are its strengths? What are its limits? I particularly wonder whether "routine policymaking" is not a
somewhat inaccurate label and one that covers too many different
ways of making policy. Consider the example of divorce reform. The
move to no-fault divorce can in some ways be called routine. The issue of how easy divorce should be had long and widely been controverted. By mid-century, those in favor of easier divorce clearly
predominated, if only because it had become plain that the enforcement problems of strict divorce were unmanageable. The divorce rate
rose inexorably despite all attempts to stem it. States like Nevada undercut the restrictive statutes of states like New York. Perjury became
common in states like New York. Courts acceded to pressure for easier divorce by manipulating divorce grounds like mental cruelty. By
the time of the social and ideological changes of the 1960s, the way
had been well prepared for no-fault divorce, and its adoption can reasonably be called the routine political implementation of a social decision. On the other hand, no such preparation paved the way for
changes in marital property and child custody law. Neither aspect of
the law had been debated on any broad scale since the nineteenth century. Thus legislatures seem to have had a more active role in actually
developing policy, and the changes they made seem correspondingly
more vulnerable. Professor Jacob apparently denominates the latter
role "routine" because it did not involve conflict. But if "routine"
policymaking is simply any nonconfiictual policymaking, the category
is so broad that it needs further development.
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To criticize a book for not doing more of what it already does well
is surely to praise with faint damns. And praise is the note on which I
wish to close. Professor Jacob has provided us with a fair-minded, and
illuminating book which much needed to be written. Students of family law will find it a valuable history of the recent transformation of
their subject. They will also find it an admirable corrective to the two
heroic views of how legal change can and should occur. The first such
view is that legislative change happens only at the behest of aroused
interest groups. The second is that legislative change happens only at
the behest of aroused courts. Professor Jacob shows us that a third, if
less heroic, view is possible and demands our attention.

